



From the Editors

Welcome to the June 2026 issue of See, Contain, Report. Transitional facilities (TFs), TF operators (OPs) and Accredited Persons (APs) play a crucial role in the sea cargo pathway by providing secure locations with trained and knowledgeable staff to manage uncleared risk goods. New Zealand is well known as a world leader in biosecurity. By working together, we deliver strong and better biosecurity.

In this issue, we highlight a fascinating discovery made by an AP at a transport company in Timaru. We hear from Toyin Adu, Biosecurity Auditor from Christchurch, in the feature article “*Strengthening the Frontline – The Auditor’s Perspective*”. We also hear from the MPI Learning and Development team, who share insights on recent improvements to digital biosecurity assessments in “*Empowering Biosecurity Through Learning*.”

If you have a great story that you would like to share with Biosecurity New Zealand or other OPs and APs nationwide, or if you have any questions or issues you would like highlighted, please contact us: Pauline Williamson (pauline.williamson@mpi.govt.nz), Janine Mayes (janine.mayes@mpi.govt.nz) or Phil Hodgson (philip.hodgson@mpi.govt.nz).

The purpose of this newsletter is to provide regular updates on the management of containment or transitional facilities by OPs, APs, and other staff. This and previous issues are available on the Biosecurity NZ website. [Resources for transitional and containment facilities](#) | [NZ Government](#)

Discovery at the Border: An Exceptional AP Find

Timaru Border Clearance Services Team (MQSTIU@mpi.govt.nz)

On 24 February, staff at Brosnan Transport Limited (BTL) opened a container originating from Turkey. During the inspection, AP Pete Corry identified notable signs of concern, including extensive webbing, dead insects, and, most importantly, small accumulations of dust (insect frass) on and around the wooden pallets supporting the cargo, indicating a potential biosecurity risk.

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BTL staff made the call to pause the unpacking process, secure the cargo and its wooden packaging inside the container, and promptly notify the local Biosecurity New Zealand team.

After confirming the findings observed by Pete and the supporting APs on site, our Timaru officers discussed next steps with the agent/importer. A supervised devan and re-palletising were recommended, as fumigation for wood-boring pests posed a risk of making the cargo unsafe for human consumption.

The supervised devan was carried out smoothly by the BTL team, with support from Biosecurity New Zealand. All 56 pallets were carefully isolated, shrink-wrapped, and securely reloaded into a spare empty container on site.

Due to logistical issues, the original plan to fumigate could not be arranged in time, so the importer/agent decided to proceed with destruction via steam sterilisation instead.

Timaru officers were able to collect four live larvae from the pallets, which were sent to the Investigation and Diagnostic Centre – Plant Health and Environment Laboratory (IDCPHEL) in Christchurch for identification. The results identified them as *Coleoptera: Cerambycidae*, a family of longhorn beetles that includes the New Zealand huhu beetle. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine the species any further.

Several species of longhorn beetles (Cerambycidae) are significant forest and agricultural pests, with some present in Turkey. Of particular concern is the invasive *Anoplophora glabripennis* (Asian longhorned beetle), which has been recorded in Istanbul. Another notable invasive species is *Anoplophora chinensis* (citrus longhorned beetle).

A further consignment of 56 pallets later arrived, also showing fresh insect frass. Once again, the BTL team stepped in to re-palletise the cargo, and this time fumigation of the isolated pallets was arranged smoothly and efficiently.

Our Timaru team would like to recognise and thank the entire BTL team for their outstanding work in managing this significant find. A special thank you to Pete Corry, Stu MacPherson, and Pete Johnstone for their hard work and diligence throughout.

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An extended thanks goes out to Izaak Brosnan and Pip O'Connell for coordinating the follow-up efforts, along with the wider team who contributed to the re-palletising and securing of the cargo.

We note that BTL has consistently maintained a strong level of APs, and this, combined with a well-established and professional relationship with local quarantine officers, has contributed to an excellent biosecurity outcome.

As Pip O'Connell, BTL Executive Manager, put it: **"Just shows the importance of our jobs as APs!"**

Strengthening the Frontline – An Auditor's Perspective – Unannounced Performance-based Verification: What to Expect

Toyin Adu: Biosecurity Auditor, ChCh (toyin.adu@mpi.govt.nz)

In the March 2024 edition of See, Contain, Report, Biosecurity New Zealand outlined the three types of verifications under the Performance Based Verification (PBV) programme: scheduled, unscheduled, and unannounced. Of these, unannounced verifications play a key role in providing real-time assurance of how TFs and Places of First Arrival operate on a day-to-day basis.

From an auditor's perspective, unannounced verifications are an important tool for strengthening the integrity of the PBV programme. They provide a realistic view of normal site operations, systems, and staff readiness without the influence of advance preparation. This helps confirm whether regulatory requirements are consistently embedded into routine practices.

Unannounced verifications may be triggered where a facility has not had one within its last five PBVs, where there are concerns about ongoing compliance, or where it is necessary to verify the effectiveness of corrective actions. While the timing is not notified in advance, visits are conducted during reasonable working hours to minimise disruption while still capturing typical operations.

On arrival, the auditor/verifier will follow standard site procedures, including signing in, formally introducing themselves, and complying with all health and safety requirements. Contact is made with the OP, nominated delegate, or a site representative at that time. If the operator or delegate is unavailable, a representative must be appointed to accompany the auditor/verifier throughout the visit.

A brief entry meeting is held to outline the purpose and scope of the verification. Compared to scheduled audits, unannounced verifications are generally shorter and more targeted, focusing on selected topics. The site walk-through and verification activities are conducted immediately following this discussion.

During the verification, objective evidence is gathered, including observations and, where appropriate, photographs. Relevant TF records are reviewed to support findings. Where

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records are not readily available at the time, they should be provided as soon as possible, with an explanation.

At the conclusion of the visit, a closing meeting is held to outline any findings. OPs are encouraged to engage openly during this process and to provide feedback both during the visit and after receiving the verification report.

Unannounced verifications are not intended to catch operators or delegates out, but to provide assurance that systems operate as intended at all times. Maintaining consistent biosecurity management practices, accessible records, regular internal audits, and strong staff training and biosecurity awareness will support acceptable PBV outcomes.

The Biosecurity Business Pledge – Partnering to Protect

Jo Darby: Manager Engagement Programme (Jo.Darby@mpi.govt.nz)

Strengthening biosecurity at the border – the role of industry leadership

For TFs and Places of First Arrival, biosecurity is a frontline responsibility. As trade grows more complex, so too do the risks. The Biosecurity Business Pledge provides a practical way for industry to step beyond compliance and take a proactive approach.

It encourages shared responsibility, lifting awareness across supply chains, strengthening day-to-day practices, and building capability among people on the ground. Biosecurity risks move with goods, equipment and people, so our response must be equally connected.

If you are struggling with ways to keep the topic of biosecurity alive in your organisations, whether at senior leadership level or hands-on at the frontline, we have tools for you.

Organisations can learn more, access practical resources, and explore the Biosecurity New Zealand training module at **bbbpledge.nz**.



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2025 Biosecurity Business Pledge Teams Background

Empowering Biosecurity Through Learning – Advanced Biosecurity Training

Learning & Development (L&D) Team APTraining@mpi.govt.nz

Digital Assessments

The L&D team are pleased to share recent improvements to our digital biosecurity assessments, designed to make them easier and more intuitive to use. Updates include clearer navigation, and improved functionality, helping users move through assessments with confidence.

Biosecurity Fact Sheets

A new suite of biosecurity pest and disease fact sheets has been developed. These visually engaging resources highlight key messages in a clear and memorable way, making them well suited for display in training rooms and shared spaces. They are designed to support biosecurity discussions and to reinforce learning.



From screens to walls, these enhancements support a more user-friendly and engaging learning experience. We encourage operators to incorporate the new fact sheets into their training environments to help strengthen understanding and application of biosecurity practices.

Update from the Border Facilities Team – Our Work in Action

Pauline Williamson: Team Manager, V&P, Border Facilities

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What are we doing?

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The Border Facilities team is currently collaborating with Biosecurity Auditors to implement a pilot programme that introduces a lead auditor for TFs operating under a single, overarching operating manual across multiple sites.

Background

Several TFs operate under a single, overarching operating manual designed to ensure consistent standards, controls, and compliance across all sites. However, current assurance activities are predominantly conducted at the individual site level.

Why is a pilot required

A pilot will allow Biosecurity New Zealand to:

- Test whether a lead-auditor model provides clearer and more efficient assurance outcomes.
- Evaluate how system-level and site-level assurance can operate together.
- Identify practical challenges before committing to permanent implementation.
- Gather evidence to support informed decision-making by leadership.

Running a pilot reduces implementation risk and allows adjustments to be made based on operational experience.

Purpose of the pilot

The purpose of the pilot is to assess whether appointing a lead auditor for TFs operating under a single operating manual:

- Improves visibility of system-wide risks and control weaknesses.
- Enhances consistency in audit scope, methodology, and reporting.
- Provides better assurance over the design and effectiveness of the overarching operating manual.
- Adds value beyond existing site-based assurance activities.

Pilot participation and next steps

Five companies have volunteered to participate in the pilot. As the pilot progresses, we will ensure all stakeholders are kept informed. Subject to its success, the lead auditor model will be incorporated into the PBV programme and rolled out nationally to eligible TFs.

MPI Support For Food Importers

Kathryn McGrail: Team Manager Imported & Domestic Food Regulatory Advice
(Kathryn.mcgrail@mpi.govt.nz)

The Food Importer Advice team at the Ministry for Primary Industries is a dedicated team who help businesses understand the food safety requirements for importing food into New Zealand.

To help importers meet their food safety responsibilities, assess the food they want to import and meet border requirements, they've put together a [Food Importer Information Pack](#). The guide includes a checklist importers can tick off as they go, as well as links to more information and who to contact if they need more help.

Find the guide on the MPI website: [Food importer Information Pack | NZ Government](#).

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The team have a range of helpful resources available on the MPI website: [Get Help With Importing Food](#) or email your questions to foodimporteradvice@mpi.govt.nz



Longhorn beetles (family *Cerambycidae*) are a group of wood-boring insects found worldwide, with over 35,000 described species. While their appearance can vary, they are easily recognised by their very long antennae, which are often as long as, or even longer than, their bodies.



Female Citrus Longhorn Beetle,
Anoplophora chinensis



Pupa inside a log with frass from feeding as a larva.

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Asian Longhorn Beetle,
Anoplophora glabripennis



Burnt Pine Longhorn, *Arhopalus ferus*

New Zealand's own huhu beetle is part of this family.



Huhu beetle, *Prionoplus reticularis*

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While some species are harmless, others are serious biosecurity threats. Their larvae tunnel deep into wood, feeding on timber and plant material. This can cause significant damage to forests, crops, and wooden packaging, and in some cases can even kill healthy trees.

One of the key signs of longhorn beetle activity is the presence of:

- Small piles of fine, sawdust-like material (known as *frass*)
- Round exit holes in wood
- Tunnelling damage within timber or pallets

Several high-risk species, including the Asian longhorned beetle (*Anoplophora glabripennis*), are known to spread through international trade, often hitchhiking in wood packaging such as pallets and crates. These pests pose a significant risk to New Zealand, as they can attack a wide range of tree species, including valuable forestry and fruit crops.

Why it matters

Longhorn beetles can be difficult to detect, as most of the damage occurs inside the wood. Early detection is critical to prevent establishment and protect New Zealand's environment and economy.

What to do

If you notice anything unusual, such as insect frass, live insects, or damage to wood packaging:

- **Stop work immediately**
- **Contain the goods**
- **Report it to Biosecurity New Zealand**

Following the **See, Contain, Report** approach helps ensure any potential risks are managed quickly and effectively.

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